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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Crystal Dawn Weimer spent more than eleven years in 
prison for murder. After her convictions were vacated, all 
charges against her were dismissed with prejudice. Weimer 
then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the County 
of Fayette, Pennsylvania; its former District Attorney, Nancy 
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Vernon; the City of Connellsville; and several city and state 
police officers violated her rights under the U.S. Constitution 
and Pennsylvania law. In this interlocutory appeal, we address 
only a narrow sliver of this sweeping case: whether absolute 
immunity or, where raised, qualified immunity shields District 
Attorney Vernon from proceeding to discovery on certain of 
Weimer’s claims.1 
 After assuring ourselves of our jurisdiction, we address 
each immunity argument in turn. We conclude that, aside from 
Vernon’s approval of the criminal complaint, because Weimer 
alleges Vernon engaged in investigatory conduct, absolute 
immunity does not protect Vernon from suit. However, we also 
hold that Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity as to 
Weimer’s failure to intervene claim and as to Vernon’s alleged 
conduct in directing officers to investigate bite-mark evidence. 
Thus, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
further proceedings.   
I 
In reviewing a district court’s “rulings on Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, our recitation 
 
1 As we explain below, our jurisdiction is premised on the 
interlocutory appealability of a denial of immunity. We may 
not, and do not, address issues that are unrelated to immunity. 
At oral argument, counsel for Fayette County and Vernon 
conceded that we lack jurisdiction to review the County’s 
appeal because a county “may not raise absolute immunity as 
a defense to a claim of municipal liability.” See Fogle v. Sokol, 
957 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)). For the same reason, 
counsel also conceded that we lack jurisdiction to review 
Vernon’s challenge to Weimer’s supervisory liability claim.  
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of the facts is limited to” the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 
allegations. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“We accept those facts as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences” in her favor. Id. 
A. The Initial Investigation into Curtis Haith’s Murder 
In the early morning hours of January 27, 2001, 
members of the Connellsville Police Department arrived at 
Curtis Haith’s apartment to find Haith, who had been beaten 
and shot in the face, lying dead outside on the sidewalk. At 
officers’ request, Vernon also came to Haith’s apartment to 
participate in and help direct the investigation.  
During their initial search of the crime scene, officers 
recovered DNA samples and found a significant amount of 
drug-related evidence inside Haith’s apartment. From speaking 
with Haith’s neighbors and friends, police learned that he had 
attended parties and had hosted a dozen or more people in his 
apartment on the evening of January 26 and into the morning 
of January 27.   
Officers soon began interviewing people who had 
attended these parties, including Weimer. When officers 
arrived at her house, Weimer was still dressed in the clothes 
she had been wearing the night before. She had minor injuries 
to her face and foot, and officers observed what looked like 
mud and blood on her clothes. Weimer told officers that she, 
Haith, and others had attended a party the night before and that 
she had given Haith a ride from that party and dropped him off 
at another party. She then spent the rest of the night at the 
housing community where her mother and sisters lived. Her 
cousin, sisters, and then-boyfriend Michael Gibson confirmed 
her story. Weimer and Gibson also told officers that Weimer 
injured her foot when they were “horseplaying” a few days 
earlier. App. 87 ¶ 31. And Weimer said that the blood on her 
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shirt and the injury to her eye were caused by a fight with 
Gibson. DNA testing later confirmed that the blood on 
Weimer’s clothes belonged to Gibson, and none of the DNA 
samples collected from the crime scene matched Weimer—in 
fact, the samples suggested a male DNA profile. 
B. Weimer Is Implicated  
In October 2002—over twenty months after the 
murder—Thomas Beal, whom Weimer had dated before 
Gibson, told police that Weimer and Gibson killed Haith. 
According to Beal, Weimer had told him that the blood on her 
clothes belonged to Haith (which, based on the DNA testing, 
could not have been correct) and that she and Gibson shot 
Haith.  
Around the same time, the Pennsylvania State Police 
Cold Case Squad began to assist with the investigation. When 
reviewing Haith’s autopsy photos, a state investigator saw 
what she believed to be a bite mark on Haith’s hand. A Fayette 
County dentist analyzed the injury. The dentist first concluded 
that Gibson bit Haith, but after examining teeth impressions for 
Weimer, she reported she could not identify which set of teeth 
caused the mark.  
A bite-mark expert then reviewed Beal’s statement, 
photos of the injury to Haith’s hand, and teeth impressions 
from Gibson and Weimer. He concluded the bite mark matched 
Weimer. Later in the investigation, questions arose as to the 
timing of the bite mark and whether it could have occurred 
hours or days before the murder. Vernon directed officers to 
investigate the timing issue, and the expert was asked to update 
his opinion. Without reviewing additional evidence, he 
determined the bite occurred seven to ten minutes before 
Haith’s death. 
After securing the bite-mark evidence, investigators 
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again spoke with Beal. Although he had previously claimed 
that Weimer had told him that she and Gibson had killed Haith, 
he now claimed “a black man named Lonnie” participated in 
the murder. App. 92 ¶ 47. Investigation into this new story, 
conducted at the direction of the police and Vernon, revealed 
that “Lonnie” was incarcerated at the time of Haith’s murder. 
Despite these puzzling changes to his story, Beal remained a 
key witness.  
In August 2003—now over two and a half years since 
the murder—Conrad Blair contacted police from prison and 
said that a fellow inmate, Joseph Stenger, had confessed that 
he was involved in Haith’s murder. Vernon and a Connellsville 
police officer interviewed Blair who told them that Stenger, 
Weimer, and Beal killed Haith. Blair also gave the interviewers 
a statement he claimed Stenger had written. The written 
statement, however, diverged from Blair’s account of 
Stenger’s supposed confession—instead of claiming Stenger 
was involved in the murder, the written statement said he 
merely helped dispose of evidence in a pond. 
Based on this interview and the written statement, 
Vernon assisted police in assembling a dive team to search the 
pond. Vernon and several officers also met with Stenger’s 
attorney, who denied that his client wrote the statement. 
C. Proceedings Against Weimer 
In late December 2003, despite the conflicting 
statements from Beal, Blair, and Stenger, officers prepared a 
criminal complaint charging Weimer with Haith’s murder, 
which Vernon approved. In January 2004—three years after 
Haith’s death—Weimer was arrested. 
The case against Weimer fell apart almost immediately. 
During a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth called Beal 
as a fact witness. While on the stand, Beal recanted his 
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previous statements implicating Weimer in Haith’s murder. 
Instead, he testified that an officer “kind of like coaxed me 
along on how to do it.” App. 94 ¶ 57. Following Beal’s 
revelation, the judge dismissed the charges, and Weimer was 
released. 
Nevertheless, investigators continued to focus their 
efforts on Weimer. In July 2004, Stenger told police he would 
implicate Weimer in exchange for a lighter sentence for his 
unrelated convictions. Based on Stenger’s new statement, 
officers again arrested and charged Weimer with Haith’s 
murder. 
Eventually, Weimer was brought to trial in Fayette 
County. On April 7, 2006, a jury convicted her of third-degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder. She was sentenced 
to fifteen to thirty years in prison. 
D. Weimer Is Exonerated 
On October 1, 2015, a judge vacated Weimer’s 
convictions and granted her request for a new trial. Weimer 
alleges that, at this point, the police officers and Vernon 
“continued to act in concert to cover up and suppress the 
wrongful actions that led to . . . Weimer’s wrongful 
convictions” and worked to “re-prosecute[] [her] for . . . [the] 
murder.” App. 100–01 ¶ 86.  
During Weimer’s postconviction relief and 2016 
pretrial proceedings, a great deal of exculpatory evidence came 
to light. For example, Stenger recanted his prior stories, 
conceding he knew nothing about Haith’s murder and that 
police had walked him through his testimony. The bite-mark 
expert also disavowed his trial testimony, stating that his 
opinion that the bite mark was Weimer’s was based on “junk 
science.” App. 102 ¶ 94. In addition, Weimer’s counsel 
discovered letters in Vernon’s files from several jailhouse 
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informants. Although the informants had testified at trial that 
they were not receiving deals in exchange for their testimony 
against Weimer, the letters revealed that they had indeed asked 
for deals and may have received them. Finally, an expert 
reviewed Haith’s autopsy report and photos of Weimer’s 
injuries on the morning of Haith’s murder. He concluded 
Weimer’s injuries were consistent with her story that she and 
Gibson had been “horseplaying” a few days before the murder. 
App. 103 ¶ 95. On June 27, 2016, the charges against Weimer 
were “dropped with prejudice.” App. 103 ¶ 96. 
E. Weimer’s Civil Rights Case 
In September 2017, Weimer filed a civil rights suit in 
the District Court, naming as defendants Fayette County, the 
Office of the Fayette County District Attorney, the City of 
Connellsville, several Connellsville police officers, one 
Pennsylvania State Police officer, and Vernon.  
As relevant to this appeal, Weimer’s First Amended 
Complaint alleged that Vernon maliciously prosecuted her in 
violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 
conspired with police to violate her civil rights, and failed to 
intervene to prevent officers from violating her constitutional 
rights.2 Vernon moved to dismiss, arguing that Weimer failed 
to state claims for relief and, in any event, that she is entitled 
 
2 Weimer also asserted claims against Vernon for deprivation 
of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania 
law. The District Court dismissed both claims with prejudice, 
and those rulings are not at issue in this appeal. Further, as 
mentioned above, Vernon conceded that we lack jurisdiction 
to review her challenge to Weimer’s supervisory liability 
claim, and, therefore, we do not discuss that claim here. 
 
9 
to absolute immunity. Vernon also argued that, if the District 
Court determined that Weimer pleaded valid claims and 
absolute immunity was not available, she was entitled to 
qualified immunity regarding the failure to intervene claim and 
for allegedly directing police to investigate the timing of the 
bite mark. 
On September 14, 2018, the District Court issued an 
opinion granting the motion in part and denying it in part. See 
Weimer v. County of Fayette (Weimer I), No. 17-1265, 2018 
WL 4404049, at *16–17 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2018). First, 
noting that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity when she 
functions as an advocate, the District Court dismissed 
Weimer’s claims with prejudice to the extent they were 
premised upon Vernon’s alleged prosecutorial misconduct.3 
The District Court dismissed the claims without prejudice, 
however, to the extent they were premised on Vernon’s 
investigatory acts. In doing so, the Court granted Weimer leave 
to amend her complaint to allege specific investigatory 
misconduct by Vernon. Finally, the Court denied the motion to 
dismiss the malicious prosecution claim only to the extent the 
claim was premised on Vernon’s investigation into the timing 
of the bite mark. The record, the Court explained, would have 
to be “further developed as it relates to the bite mark and 
Vernon’s conduct concerning the [bite-mark] investigation . . . 
before it c[ould] be determined whether she is entitled to 
qualified immunity on this issue.” Id. at *9.  
 
3 Specifically, the Court held that Vernon was entitled to 
absolute immunity for prosecuting Weimer using false 
statements and bite-mark evidence, failing to disclose evidence 
to defense counsel, allowing or encouraging witnesses to 
testify falsely, and making misleading statements during 
closing arguments. Weimer I, 2018 WL 4404049, at *9 n.3. 
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Following the issuance of the September 2018 order, 
Weimer filed a Second Amended Complaint. The new 
complaint also asserted malicious prosecution, civil rights 
conspiracy, and failure to intervene claims against Vernon, and 
Weimer added additional factual allegations to support these 
claims. Vernon again moved to dismiss, arguing that Weimer 
failed to plead Vernon’s involvement in the police 
investigation to support the claims the District Court had 
dismissed without prejudice. Vernon also argued that if 
Weimer’s Second Amended Complaint adequately stated a 
failure to intervene claim against her, it should be barred by 
qualified immunity. 
On April 5, 2019, the District Court denied the second 
motion to dismiss the civil rights conspiracy and failure to 
intervene claims.4 Weimer v. County of Fayette (Weimer II), 
No. 17-1265, 2019 WL 1509664 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2019). 
First, it held that Weimer stated a claim for civil rights 
conspiracy because the Second Amended Complaint 
sufficiently alleged Vernon’s involvement in the police 
investigation and her awareness of conflicting evidence 
throughout the investigation. Second, the Court held that 
Weimer pleaded facts to support a failure to intervene claim 
against Vernon and that Vernon was not entitled to qualified 
immunity on this claim.  
Vernon now appeals aspects of both the September 
 
4 The District Court did not address the malicious prosecution 
claim in the April 2019 order. As we explain in further detail 
below, the Court’s failure to address whether the newly 
pleaded allegations in the Second Amended Complaint could 
also serve as factual bases for the malicious prosecution claim 
seems to us an oversight. 
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2018 and April 2019 orders.  
II 
Before turning to the merits, we must address an 
antecedent challenge to our jurisdiction. See Montanez v. 
Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We necessarily 
exercise de novo review over an argument alleging a lack of 
appellate jurisdiction.”). The District Court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Weimer 
argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 because neither of the District Court’s orders are 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. According to 
Weimer, the District Court did not rule on Vernon’s 
entitlement to absolute immunity in the April 2019 order, nor 
did the determinations in that order turn on issues of law. The 
rulings in the September 2018 order are not properly before us, 
Weimer argues, because Vernon failed to appeal any adverse 
determinations in that order within thirty days as required by 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). As we explain 
below, we hold that we may properly exercise jurisdiction over 
all issues Vernon raises on appeal.  
 We have jurisdiction to review “appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. District 
court orders that finally and conclusively “determine claims of 
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
[underlying] action” are final for purposes of § 1291 and are 
immediately appealable. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). “[A] district court’s denial of 
a claim of [official] immunity, to the extent that it turns on an 
issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’” under the 
collateral order doctrine because official immunity is an 
entitlement to avoid the costs of trial and the burdens of broad-
reaching discovery. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 
 
12 
530 (1985); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 
1460–61, 1461 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that, unlike a factual 
claim, such as “the ‘I didn’t do it’ defense,” which “relates 
strictly to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim,” a claim of official 
immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine). An interlocutory order appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine must be appealed within thirty days of 
its entry. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also In re Montgomery 
County, 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The Rule 4(a) 
deadline for civil cases applies to all appealable orders, 
including collateral orders, specifically orders denying 
immunity.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 Our jurisdiction over the immunity determinations in 
the April 2019 order, which Vernon appealed within thirty 
days of its entry, is fairly straightforward.  
First, the April 2019 order conclusively determined that 
Vernon is not entitled to absolute immunity. In the September 
2018 order, the District Court set out the standard, stating that 
a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity “[i]n initiating a 
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” but not for 
“investigative evidence-gathering.” Weimer I, 2018 WL 
4404049, at *8 (citations omitted). The Court then permitted 
Weimer to amend her complaint to allege that Vernon engaged 
in investigatory misconduct, which would not be protected by 
prosecutorial immunity. When Weimer amended her 
complaint, Vernon again moved to dismiss, arguing Weimer 
was granted limited leave to amend to allege specific 
investigatory wrongdoing by Vernon but failed to do so. In 
rejecting her argument, the District Court conclusively denied 
Vernon’s entitlement to absolute immunity at the motion-to-
dismiss stage.5 See Weimer II, 2019 WL 1509664, at *9–10, 
 
5 Specifically, the District Court stated that Weimer’s Second 
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12. 
Second, the April 2019 order conclusively denied 
qualified immunity on the failure to intervene claim. Although 
the District Court said it might revisit Vernon’s entitlement to 
immunity at a later stage in the litigation, the practical effect of 
the order was to require Vernon to proceed to discovery on this 
claim, despite her argument that she should not be required to 
do so. See Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2017); 
George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 Our jurisdiction over the September 2018 order is more 
complicated, but we need not decide whether that order, 
granting leave to amend, was immediately appealable. Even if 
the District Court’s conclusion regarding the bite-mark 
investigation in its September 2018 order was immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, Vernon’s failure 
to appeal within thirty days did not deprive her of the 
opportunity to appeal the order’s adverse rulings because 
another appealable order—the April 2019 order—was 
subsequently entered and timely appealed. Indeed, “several 
courts of appeals have held explicitly, across a wide range of 
 
Amended Complaint “makes multiple allegations of Vernon’s 
involvement in the police investigation” and, therefore, Vernon 
is not entitled to absolute immunity on the civil rights 
conspiracy or failure to intervene claims. Weimer II, 2019 WL 
1509664, at *9–10. To support this holding the District Court 
cited a list of paragraphs in the Second Amended Complaint. 
See Odd, 539 F.3d at 210. Here, we conclude we have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of absolute 
immunity, and, below, in Part III.A, we proceed to parse the 
Second Amended Complaint to determine whether Weimer 
alleges investigative conduct, to which absolute immunity 
would not apply.   
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collateral order appeal circumstances, that failure to take an 
available collateral order appeal does not forfeit the right to 
review the order on appeal from a final judgment,” as long as 
the issue has not become moot. 15A Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3911 & n.78 (2d ed. 2020) (collecting cases). 
One of our sister circuits has taken this concept a step 
further, holding it had jurisdiction to review two interlocutory 
orders—both of which effectively denied sovereign immunity 
to Iran—even though Iran failed to appeal the earlier of the two 
orders within thirty days. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
637 F.3d 783, 790–92 (7th Cir. 2011). The court stated that 
“[t]he failure to timely appeal an immunity order under the 
collateral-order doctrine . . . postpones review until another 
appealable order”—including an interlocutory order—“is 
entered.” Id. at 791. Therefore, “Iran’s timely appeal of [the 
later-in-time collateral] order permit[ted] review of the 
earlier—and closely related—immunity decision.” Id. We, too, 
have suggested that if the Rule 4(a) deadline is missed, the 
order is not immediately appealable and the party “must then 
wait until another appealable order . . . is entered, upon appeal 
of which [s]he can challenge any interlocutory order that has 
not become moot.” In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 372 
(citation omitted). Here, we have jurisdiction over the 
immunity rulings in the September 2018 order because the 
April 2019 order—which dealt with closely related immunity 
questions at the motion-to-dismiss stage—was an appealable 
order, Vernon appealed within the thirty-day window, and the 
immunity issue was not moot. 
 A contrary holding would contravene “the historic 
federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956); see also Fed. Home 
Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 438 
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(3d Cir. 2003) (the “finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
is grounded ‘not in merely technical conceptions of finality,’ 
but rather on a long-recognized policy ‘against piecemeal 
litigation’” (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 
233–34 (1945))). Under the circumstances of this case, 
requiring Vernon to either file two separate appeals at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage or risk forfeiting her appellate rights 
would be inconsistent with this long-recognized tradition.6 
 
6 Weimer argues that Vernon waived her opportunity to appeal 
the denial of qualified immunity for her alleged conduct in 
directing police to investigate the bite mark. In her motion to 
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Vernon stated that 
several of Weimer’s claims should be dismissed and Weimer 
“should only be permitted to proceed on her malicious 
prosecution claim against Vernon for [Vernon’s] alleged 
involvement in securing bite[-]mark evidence.” App. 136–37. 
Given the unique circumstances of this case, the procedural 
posture before the District Court, and the rule we describe 
above, we do not see this statement or Vernon’s failure to re-
raise the issue of qualified immunity regarding the bite-mark 
investigation in her second motion to dismiss as fatal to her 
appeal of that issue. Because the District Court granted 
Vernon’s first motion to dismiss in large measure but gave 
Weimer limited leave to amend her complaint, Vernon would 
have reasonably understood that her arguments in the second 
motion to dismiss should have been directed only to those 
issues for which Weimer had been granted leave to amend. 
Accordingly, Vernon’s acknowledgement in her motion before 
the District Court that she would not relitigate issues the 
District Court had already decided in the September 2018 order 
did not amount to a waiver of her appellate rights over this 
argument.  
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 Finally, although Vernon’s notice of appeal designates 
only the April 2019 order as the order on appeal, we may still 
consider the District Court’s bite-mark rulings in the 
September 2018 order. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal “designate the 
judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” However, we 
“liberally construe[] notices of appeal.” Sulima v. Tobyhanna 
Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted). We may “exercise jurisdiction over orders not 
specified in the [n]otice of [a]ppeal if: (1) there is a connection 
between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention 
to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the 
opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to 
brief the issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Here, there is a connection between the September 
2018 order addressing Vernon’s first motion to dismiss on 
immunity grounds and the April 2019 order, in which the 
District Court conclusively determined that, for the balance of 
Weimer’s claims, Vernon was not entitled to dismissal based 
on immunity. Vernon’s intent to appeal the District Court’s 
denial of qualified immunity regarding her investigation into 
the bite mark is clear from her opening brief. And Weimer was 
not prejudiced because she had the opportunity to respond, and 
did respond, to Vernon’s argument on the merits in her 
answering brief. 
III 
Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to 
the merits. Vernon argues that the District Court erred in failing 
to dismiss certain of Weimer’s claims against her because she 
is entitled to (A) absolute immunity on all of Weimer’s § 1983 
claims and (B) qualified immunity on the failure to intervene 
claim and for her alleged involvement in directing officers to 
investigate the timing of the bite-mark evidence. Our review of 
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these issues is plenary. Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 
129, 134 (3d Cir. 2006). 
A. Absolute Immunity 
Section 1983 “provides that every person who acts 
under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional 
right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages.” 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted). However, the 
Supreme Court “has consistently recognized” that the statute 
“was not meant to abolish wholesale all common-law 
immunities” available at the time of its enactment in 1871. 
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Thus, some officials are entitled 
to “absolute protection from damages liability” because they 
“perform special functions” similar “to functions that would 
have been immune when Congress enacted § 1983.” Fogle, 
957 F.3d at 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Noting both “a common law tradition of prosecutorial 
immunity and strong policy considerations that supported 
extending immunity to the § 1983 context,” the Supreme Court 
has held that prosecutors are immune from suit when they 
perform prosecutorial functions. Odd, 538 F.3d at 208 (citing 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420–21, 424). The defense does not protect 
a prosecutor’s actions wholesale merely because she is a 
prosecutor. Fogle, 957 F.3d at 159. Rather, absolute immunity 
“attaches [only] to actions intimately associated with the 
judicial phases of litigation, . . . not to administrative or 
investigatory actions unrelated to initiating and conducting 
judicial proceedings.” Odd, 538 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). The prosecutor “seeking absolute 
immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is 
justified for the [specific] function in question.” Fogle, 957 
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F.3d at 159 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486). “[T]o earn the 
protections of absolute immunity” at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage, “a defendant must show that the conduct triggering 
absolute immunity ‘clearly appear[s] on the face of the 
complaint.’” Id. at 161 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
Determining which of a prosecutor’s actions were 
prosecutorial in nature “is a fact-specific” inquiry. Id. at 160. 
We must “ascertain just what conduct forms the basis for the 
plaintiff’s cause of action” and “[t]hen . . . determine what 
function (prosecutorial, administrative, investigative, or 
something else entirely) that act served.” Id. at 161 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Importantly, “while we 
tend to discuss prosecutorial immunity based on alleged acts, 
our ultimate analysis is whether a defendant has established 
absolute prosecutorial immunity from a given claim.” Id. 
As relevant to this appeal, Weimer asserts three claims 
against Vernon: malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, 
and failure to intervene. The September 2018 order held that 
all the allegations in support of these claims (aside from 
Vernon’s participation in the bite-mark investigation) involved 
prosecutorial misconduct. However, in the April 2019 order, 
the District Court broadly concluded that Weimer’s Second 
Amended Complaint “makes multiple allegations of Vernon’s 
involvement in the police investigation,” so Vernon’s 
entitlement to absolute immunity was not clear on the face of 
the complaint.7 Weimer II, 2019 WL 1509664, at *9.  
 
7 The April 2019 order addressed only whether the Second 
Amended Complaint pleaded investigative acts to support the 
civil rights conspiracy and failure to intervene claims. It did not 
address the malicious prosecution claim. To be sure, the 
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To support this holding, the District Court cited 
numerous paragraphs in the Second Amended Complaint. 
However, it failed to “dissect[]” Vernon’s alleged actions to 
determine whether they were prosecutorial or investigative in 
nature. Odd, 538 F.3d at 210. Thus, we must now “defin[e] 
[each] act” that Weimer added to her Second Amended 
Complaint to determine whether the District Court erred in 
 
September 2018 order had already held that the malicious 
prosecution claim remained viable to the extent it was 
premised upon Vernon’s investigation into the bite mark. But 
that order also, as for the other claims, granted Weimer “leave 
to file a second amended complaint to identify specific 
wrongful investigatory acts by Vernon” to further support the 
malicious prosecution claim. Weimer I, 2018 WL 4404049, at 
*10. Vernon’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint reasserted absolute immunity as to all claims for 
which Weimer was granted leave to amend, including the 
malicious prosecution claim. It seems to us an oversight that 
the District Court failed to address whether the newly pleaded 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint could also serve 
as factual bases for the malicious prosecution claim. 
Accordingly, even though, as we explain in Part III.B.2, 
Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious 
prosecution claim to the extent the claim is premised on her 
investigation into the bite-mark evidence, we think the 
malicious prosecution claim may remain viable to the extent it 
is premised on other investigative activities—including, as we 
describe above, Vernon’s involvement at the crime scene and 
investigation into witness statements—to which absolute 
immunity does not apply and for which qualified immunity 
was not requested.  
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concluding that these actions were investigative.8 See Fogle, 
957 F.3d at 161 (alterations in original) (quoting Odd, 538 F.3d 
at 212).   
1. Involvement at the Crime Scene 
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Vernon 
arrived at Haith’s apartment a few hours after the Connellsville 
Police Department because a Connellsville detective 
“requested [her presence at] the crime scene so that she could 
be involved in and help to direct the murder investigation from 
the onset of the investigation.” App. 86 ¶ 23. During their 
initial search of the crime scene, officers recovered DNA 
samples, found drug-related evidence, and learned that Haith 
had attended parties the night before and morning of his 
murder. The initial crime-scene investigation led police to 
interview Weimer because she had attended one of these 
parties. And, although “DNA testing performed at the crime 
scene” and later “on . . . Weimer’s clothing” confirmed 
Weimer’s account of her whereabouts from the night before 
and suggested “an unidentified male” was involved in Haith’s 
murder, App. 88 ¶ 32, investigators zeroed in on Weimer, 
ignoring evidence from the crime scene and other potential 
leads. 
Vernon’s alleged role in the initial crime-scene 
investigation was investigative in nature. Although we must be 
 
8 Vernon appears to concede that she was functioning as an 
investigator when she investigated the bite-mark evidence. In 
her opening brief, she argues that she is entitled only to 
qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, for her alleged 
participation in the bite-mark investigation. Therefore, we will 
not separately parse out this conduct to assess whether it was 
prosecutorial or investigative in nature.  
 
21 
wary of “bright-line rules that would treat the timing of the 
prosecutor’s action” as dispositive, Vernon’s alleged act of 
helping to direct the crime-scene investigation occurred long 
before a criminal complaint had been drafted and before any 
suspect had even been identified. See Odd, 538 F.3d at 210. 
Thus, these allegations “point[] more convincingly to 
‘investigation’ than to ‘prosecution.’” See Kulwicki, 969 F.2d 
at 1466.  
2. Participation in Interviews of and Reliance on 
Statements by Beal, Blair, and Stenger 
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Vernon 
and the police investigators manipulated evidence and 
knowingly continued to investigate contradictory witness 
statements in the period leading up to Weimer’s arrest. 
Specifically, Vernon and the police continued to rely on Beal’s 
statements, despite the fact that one of his versions of Haith’s 
murder involved a man named “Lonnie,” who was incarcerated 
at the time of the murder. In addition, Vernon and several 
officers interviewed Blair at Vernon’s office, and, based on 
that interview and the contradictory statement allegedly written 
by Stenger, Vernon helped assemble a dive team to search a 
pond for evidence and interviewed Stenger’s counsel. Even 
though the written statement contradicted Blair’s account of 
Stenger’s involvement, and even though Stenger’s counsel 
denied that Stenger had authored the statement, the 
investigators continued to rely on the written statement in their 
investigation into Weimer. 
Given these allegations (which we assume here to be 
true), Vernon cannot show that the defense of absolute 
immunity appears clearly on the face of the complaint. See 
Fogle, 957 F.3d at 161. This alleged conduct—investigating 
leads before criminal charges have been filed—is more akin to 
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“the detective’s role in searching for the clues and 
corroboration that might give h[er] probable cause to 
recommend that a suspect be arrested” than “the advocate’s 
role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as [s]he 
prepares for trial.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 
(1993); see id. at 274–75 (holding prosecutors were acting as 
detectives rather than advocates when they investigated a 
bootprint because, at the time, they lacked probable cause to 
arrest or initiate judicial proceedings against the suspect). And, 
again, although we resist bright-line rules based on the timing 
of the prosecutor’s alleged activities, the Second Amended 
Complaint alleges that this misconduct occurred months before 
Weimer was charged with Haith’s murder. 
3. Approval of the Criminal Complaint 
Weimer’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that 
“nearly three years after . . . Haith’s murder,” the investigation 
had “uncovered statements made by three different persons—
Beal, Blair and Stenger—that were patently inconsistent, and . 
. . contradicted by known DNA evidence.” App. 93 ¶ 53. 
Nevertheless, Vernon and several officers “agreed to proceed 
with filing criminal charges against” Weimer. App. 93 ¶ 54. 
The officers then prepared a criminal complaint, which Vernon 
approved.  
Vernon’s approval of the criminal complaint is 
protected by prosecutorial immunity. We have long maintained 
that “[t]he decision to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a 
prosecutor’s judicial role.” Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1463; see 
also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (holding a 
prosecutor’s “activities in connection with the preparation and 
filing” of a criminal information and motion for arrest were 
protected by absolute immunity). 
* * * 
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In sum, Vernon is entitled to absolute immunity only for 
her alleged conduct in deciding to file and approving the 
criminal complaint against Weimer. She is entitled to absolute 
immunity neither for her alleged involvement at the crime 
scene on the morning of Haith’s murder, nor for her 
investigation into statements by Beal, Blair, and Stenger. To 
the extent that this investigatory conduct forms the basis of 
Weimer’s malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, and 
failure to intervene claims against Vernon, we will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of Vernon’s motion to dismiss these 
claims based on absolute immunity.9 
 
9 Weimer also alleges that after her convictions were vacated, 
“the individual Defendants continued to act in concert to cover 
up and suppress the wrongful actions that led to [her] wrongful 
convictions,” and they “attempted to create additional evidence 
. . . with the intent of re-prosecuting [her] for . . . Haith’s 
murder.” App. 100–01 ¶ 86. Vernon argues that any allegations 
in the Second Amended Complaint “regarding an after-the-fact 
cover-up are not investigatory.” Appellants’ Br. 24. From our 
review of the Second Amended Complaint, it appears that 
Weimer alleges broadly that all the defendants worked together 
to cover up their involvement in the wrongful investigation, but 
Weimer does not set out any specific wrongful conduct by 
Vernon during this period. Based on the lack of specificity in 
the Second Amended Complaint, and based on the fact that 
Vernon was, by this point, a sitting Court of Common Pleas 
Judge in Fayette County, it is exceedingly difficult for us to 
determine whether Vernon would be entitled to absolute 
immunity for any alleged conduct after Weimer’s convictions 
were vacated and during her pretrial proceedings in 2016. 
Therefore, we note only that, insofar as Weimer’s claims 
against Vernon remain premised on Vernon’s alleged 
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B. Qualified Immunity 
“Prosecutors who are not entitled to absolute immunity 
from a plaintiff’s claims may nonetheless be entitled to 
qualified immunity from those same claims.” Yarris, 465 F.3d 
at 139. Under the now-familiar standard for the judge-created 
defense of qualified immunity, a state officer is shielded from 
a suit for monetary damages under § 1983 unless “the official 
violated a . . . constitutional right,” and “the right was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). “[A] defendant cannot be said to have 
violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours 
were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the 
defendant’s shoes would have understood that [s]he was 
violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 
(2014). That is, the legal rule must have been “dictated by 
controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. 
Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
“clearly established law should not be defined at a high level 
of generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per 
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A rule is too 
general if the unlawfulness of the [official’s] conduct does not 
follow immediately from the conclusion that the rule was 
firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (alteration, 
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
Vernon contends she is entitled to qualified immunity 
 
participation in an after-the-fact cover up or an effort to 
prosecute Weimer anew, any absolute immunity defense is not 
apparent on the face of the Second Amended Complaint. See 
Fogle, 957 F.3d at 161. 
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for her failure to intervene in the allegedly unconstitutional 
police investigation and for directing police to investigate the 
timing of the bite mark on Haith’s hand.  
1. Failure to Intervene in the Police Investigation 
Weimer alleges that Vernon participated in the reckless 
and deliberately indifferent police investigation and “had 
reasonable and realistic opportunities to intervene to prevent 
the violations of . . . Weimer’s constitutional rights.” App. 109 
¶ 123. Vernon responds that she is entitled to qualified 
immunity because, “at the time of the allegations, no clearly 
established [law] existed to put [her] on notice” that, as a 
prosecutor, her failure to intervene in the police investigation 
would violate Weimer’s rights. Appellants’ Br. 30. We agree.  
It is well established in our Circuit that both police and 
corrections officers must “take reasonable steps to protect a 
victim from another officer’s use of excessive force.” Smith v. 
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Baker 
v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193–94 (3d Cir. 1995). But 
we have not extended this duty to prosecutors who fail to 
intervene to prevent police from conducting unconstitutional 
investigations. Accordingly, we cannot say that “any 
reasonable [prosecutor]” investigating Haith’s murder would 
have understood that she was violating Weimer’s 
constitutional rights in failing to intervene to prevent improper 
investigatory conduct by police. See Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 
778–79. Put differently, the facts here are simply too dissimilar 
from those in the excessive force cases for us to hold that those 
cases would have put Vernon on notice that her actions were 
unlawful. 
 Although the District Court acknowledged that there 
was no “case law in the Third Circuit holding a prosecutor 
liable for a failure to intervene in the conduct of police 
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officers,” it identified “[a] subsequent decision from the 
[Western District of Pennsylvania that] ha[d] extended liability 
for a failure to intervene claim to prosecutors who [were] 
engaging in investigative conduct.” Weimer II, 2019 WL 
1509664, at *10 (citing Fogle v. Sokol, No. 17-194, 2018 WL 
6831137 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2018), aff’d 957 F.3d at 148).10 
Thus, the District Court permitted Weimer’s claim to proceed 
“[g]iven the recent developments in this area of the law and the 
early stage of this case.” Id. at *12. However, a district court 
opinion from 2018 cannot serve as a basis for holding that a 
prosecutor’s duty to intervene to prevent an unconstitutional 
police investigation was clearly established between 2001 and 
2006. For a legal principle to be clearly established, it must be 
based on precedent existing at the time of the official’s act, and 
the holding of one district judge, which “is not controlling 
authority in any jurisdiction, much less in the entire United 
States,” is insufficient to clearly establish a violation of a 
constitutional right. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Fogle, 2018 WL 6831137, 
at *11–12 (defining its holding as an “extension” of our 
excessive force case law to prosecutors).11  
 
10 Our opinion on appeal in Fogle merely affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the prosecutors’ motion to dismiss Fogle’s 
claims based on absolute immunity. Fogle, 957 F.3d at 165. 
Here, in contrast, Vernon has not only requested absolute 
immunity on the failure to intervene claim, but she also claims 
that if absolute immunity does not shield her from suit on this 
claim, qualified immunity applies.  
11 District courts appear to disagree as to whether prosecutors 
have a duty to intervene in police investigations. See Patrick v. 
City of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1054–55 (N.D. Ill. 
2016) (noting courts within its district “are split on whether 
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 Finally, Weimer argues that “the proper inquiry is 
whether, at the time of the events in 2001 [to] 2004, [she] had 
the [c]onstitutional right to be free from a reckless and 
deliberately indifferent police investigation.” Appellee’s Br. 
24. Yet this obscures the fact that Weimer specifically asserted 
a failure to intervene claim. Whatever might be said of the 
investigation, the question here is whether Weimer had a 
clearly established right to have Vernon take reasonable steps 
to protect her from an unconstitutional police investigation. 
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define 
clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. at 742. Weimer’s reframing of the constitutional 
violation at issue does not change the fact that there was no 
clearly established law at the time of Vernon’s allegedly 
violative conduct that would have placed the constitutional 
question she confronted—to intervene in the police 
investigation or not to intervene—“beyond debate.” See 
Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 779 (citation omitted). 
2. Investigation into the Timing of the Bite Mark 
Weimer alleges that at some point during the 
investigation, Vernon told officers to investigate the timing of 
the bite mark on Haith’s hand. The bite-mark expert was then 
 
prosecutors have a duty to intervene” and recognizing that 
there “are good reasons to be cautious in expanding the law . . 
. to include . . . State’s Attorneys”). Disagreement among 
district judges may, in and of itself, be a reason to recognize a 
qualified immunity defense. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009) (noting lower courts had 
“reached divergent conclusions regarding how the . . . standard 
[at issue] applie[d],” and stating that “these differences of 
opinion from our own are substantial enough to require 
immunity”). 
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“asked to update his opinions to address and eliminate any 
timing concerns.” App. 91 ¶ 45. The expert, without reviewing 
additional evidence, concluded that the bite occurred shortly 
before Haith’s death. The “Defendants were aware that [the 
expert] was not provided any additional evidence or materials 
upon which to base his additional opinions, but nevertheless” 
continued “to rely upon the manufactured evidence.” App. 91 
¶ 45. Vernon argues she is entitled to qualified immunity for 
directing further investigation into the bite-mark evidence. We 
agree. 
During the relevant time period—from late 2002 to 
early 2006—the unreliability of bite-mark evidence was not 
widely recognized such that “any reasonable official in 
[Vernon’s] shoes would have understood that [s]he was 
violating” Weimer’s rights by directing officers to investigate 
the timing of the bite mark on Haith’s hand. See Plumhoff, 572 
U.S. at 778–79. Despite allegations that the bite-mark expert 
later referred to such evidence as “junk science” during 
Weimer’s postconviction proceedings, see App. 102 ¶ 94, such 
evidence was widely used in criminal proceedings during and 
after Weimer’s trial, see Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: 
The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1369, 1375–87, 1408 (2009) (outlining the scientific 
unreliability of bite-mark evidence and arguing that judges 
“circumvent[] their gate-keeping responsibilities” by 
“continu[ing] to admit bite-mark testimony into evidence”); 
see also Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 824–25 (5th Cir. 
2017) (holding forensic odontologists were entitled to qualified 
immunity when the plaintiffs showed only that the evidence 
the experts presented at trial in the 1990s was no longer 
considered trustworthy by later standards and that the experts 
may have been negligent in their analysis). Thus, based on the 
law as it existed at the time, Vernon was not on notice that her 
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alleged conduct of directing further investigation into the bite-
mark evidence would violate Weimer’s rights. 
* * * 
In sum, Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity from 
Weimer’s failure to intervene claim and from the malicious 
prosecution claim insofar as it relies upon Vernon’s direction 
to investigate the timing of the bite mark.   
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. To the extent that Vernon’s alleged investigatory 
conduct, as identified above, forms the basis of Weimer’s 
malicious prosecution and civil rights conspiracy claims 
against Vernon, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Vernon’s motion to dismiss these claims based on absolute 
immunity. We will, however, reverse the District Court’s 
denial of absolute immunity for Vernon’s approval of the 
criminal complaint and its denial of Vernon’s motion to 
dismiss the failure to intervene claim on the basis of qualified 
immunity. We will also reverse the District Court’s denial of 
qualified immunity for Vernon’s alleged conduct in directing 
officers to investigate the timing of the bite mark. Because 
qualified immunity shields Vernon from suit for her 
investigation into the bite-mark evidence, this conduct cannot 
be used to support Weimer’s malicious prosecution claim 
against Vernon. 
